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Michael Rabinder James

Tribal sovereignty and the
intercultural public sphere

Abstract While theorists of cultural pluralism have generally supported
tribal sovereignty to protect threatened Native cultures, they fail to address
adequately cultural conflicts between Native and non-Native communities,
especially when tribal sovereignty facilitates illiberal or undemocratic
practices. In response, I draw on Jürgen Habermas’ conceptions of discourse and the public sphere to develop a universalist approach to cultural
pluralism, called the ‘intercultural public sphere’, which analyzes how
cultures can engage in mutual learning and mutual criticism under fair
conditions. This framework accommodates cultural diversity within
formally universalistic parameters while avoiding four common criticisms
of universalist approaches to cultural pluralism. But this framework differs
from that of Habermas in two ways. First, it includes ‘subaltern’ publics,
open only to members of cultural subgroups, in order to counter relations
of ‘cultural power’. Second, it admits ‘strong’ publics, democratic institutions with decision-making powers. Finally, I show how the subaltern,
strong institutions of tribal sovereignty contribute to the fair discursive
conditions required for mutual learning and mutual critique in an intercultural public sphere.
Key words

Habermas · Kymlicka · Native peoples · sovereignty · tribal

Introduction
In Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez the Supreme Court granted ultimate
jurisdiction over Native civil cases to tribal courts, established by the
1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). This ruling upheld a Santa Clara
ordinance granting member status to the children of men who married
outside of the tribe while excluding the children of women who did so.
As a result, the children of Julia Martinez, a Pueblo woman who married
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a Navajo man, were prevented from gaining title to her Pueblo-administered public housing (Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez 98 US 1670
[1978]; Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 133–6). Santa Clara Pueblo perplexes
democratic theories of cultural pluralism because a measure aimed at
overcoming the oppression of one group – granting tribal sovereignty to
Native American nations – exacerbates the oppression of another group
– female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo. For example, Iris Marion
Young defends the IRA’s re-establishment of tribal sovereignty through
the contention that ‘justice towards groups requires special rights, and
that an assimilation ideal amounts to genocide’ (Young, 1990: 182).
However, Santa Clara Pueblo suggests that tribal sovereignty may also
reinforce the oppression of another group, women, whose restricted
marital choices might reflect Young’s notion of ‘domination’, whereby
one group exercises unreciprocated control over another group’s actions
(see Young, 1990: 38). In this way, Santa Clara Pueblo illuminates a
lacuna in contemporary democratic theories of cultural pluralism.
For the most part, theorists such as Will Kymlicka (1989 and 1995),
Frances Svennson (1979), James Tully (1995) and Young herself (1990)
have emphasized how tribal sovereignty protects threatened Native cultures and represents a crucial step in the realization of egalitarian, democratic goals within a culturally pluralistic society.1 However, the problem
of cultural conflict suggests that democratic theories of cultural pluralism must also articulate a universalist orientation. Universalist
approaches are often seen as an obstacle to the just accommodation of
diverse cultural groups.2 However, I argue that a universalist orientation
to cultural pluralism is crucial to a just democratic theory, since it can
demonstrate how tribal sovereignty can facilitate fair and critical communication among Native and non-Native communities. But in order to
do so, a universalist theory of democratic cultural pluralism should
include three components.
First, a universalist theory can defend the protection of diverse cultural groups so long as they uphold formally universalistic conditions
for the fair creation of governing norms. Second, this formal universality should clearly articulate the conditions of public autonomy, understood as the discursive participation of all affected parties in the
formation of legitimate norms. In this way, this theory can defend itself
against four common criticisms of universalist approaches: rigid uniformity; the constraint of public debate to neutral themes; false impartiality; and the neglect of power relations. Finally, a universalist theory
should articulate an ‘intercultural public sphere’ within which cultures
can mutually learn from and criticize each other, to the extent that conditions free of power relations are approximated. In this way, critical
intercultural engagement avoids descending into the cultural devastation
of the weak by the strong.
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In this essay, I draw on Jürgen Habermas’ conceptions of discourse
and the public sphere to construct a universalist, discursive theory of
democratic cultural pluralism. In Section I, I describe how Kymlicka,
Svennson, Tully and Young theoretically analyze tribal sovereignty. In
Section II, I examine Habermas’ conception of discourse in light of cultural pluralism and defend its position against four possible criticisms.
In Section III, I sketch the contours of an ‘intercultural public sphere’
within which cultural groups can discursively engage in mutual learning
and mutual critique. Finally in Section IV, I suggest how the framework
of the intercultural public sphere would analyze tribal sovereignty as a
condition for mutual learning and mutual criticism among Native and
non-Native communities.

I Tribal sovereignty and cultural diversity in contemporary
political theory
It is with good reason that tribal sovereignty is supported for its protection of marginalized Native cultures. The history of American Indian
law is littered with misguided attempts to assimilate Native Americans,
through policies ranging from the liquidation of communal Indian land
to the direct prohibition of traditional languages and religions.3 For the
most part, these policies were unilaterally imposed through Congressional ‘plenary power’, an extra-constitutional doctrine which allows
Congress to rule Native peoples without their collective consent.4 The
advent of plenary power overturned precedents respecting tribal sovereignty established by the ‘Marshall Trilogy’,5 three Supreme Court decisions based on pre-constitutional treaties. These decisions came closest
to defending an egalitarian relationship between the federal government
and tribes, given American hegemony over Native territory. The rejection of these precedents hastened the erosion of tribal sovereignty
(Berger, 1991: 68).
The first alteration in the structure of tribal sovereignty was the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), which authorized tribes to
draft self-governing constitutions that were to be ratified by tribal elections (Cornell, 1988: 91–2; Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 100; Pommersheim,
1995: 64–5). While it is difficult to assess just how robustly the IRA
recognized and protected Native cultures,6 it did allow tribes to govern
themselves, to present a unified tribal position against the federal government, and to accept or reject constitutional reorganization. However, the
second major alteration in tribal sovereignty, the 1968 Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA), was more ambiguous. On the one hand, the ICRA
exemplified Congressional plenary power, since it unilaterally extended
many Constitutional protections of individual liberty to tribes without
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their approval and often over their resistance (Deloria and Lytle, 1983:
128). On the other hand, individual Indians could claim their ICRA
rights only through tribal courts, except for appeals for habeas corpus
petitions. It was precisely this limitation of federal review over tribal
court decisions that prompted the court’s decision in Santa Clara Pueblo
(Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez 98 US 1670 [1978], 49–50; Burnett,
1972). In this way, the ICRA and Santa Clara Pueblo provided the
firmest grounding for tribal sovereignty since the Marshall trilogy. Yet
as we saw earlier, Santa Clara Pueblo, precisely in its affirmation of tribal
sovereignty, also raises daunting problems for democratic theories of cultural pluralism.
So what happens when, in situations like Santa Clara Pueblo, the
establishment of tribal sovereignty simultaneously supports egalitarian
democratic ideals for cultural identities while undermining such ideals for
female tribal members?7 Or, to take a different example, how should
democratic theorists of cultural pluralism react when tribal governments
suppress the religious beliefs of their members? Indeed, while the federal
government has historically suppressed indigenous religions, in recent
years tribal sovereignty has abetted the suppression of religious freedom
on reservations. For instance, while a federal court upheld a Navajo
Council ordinance banning the religious use of Peyote, since tribal
governments are not directly limited by the First Amendment (Native
American Church v Navajo Tribal Council [272 F.2d 131, 10th Cir.,
1959]), the Supreme Court of California overturned a similar state ban
on First Amendment grounds (People v Woody [61 Cal. 2d. 716, 394
P.2d. 813, 1964).8 Relatedly, Delfino Concha, a Protestant member of the
quasi-Catholic, quasi-theocratic Taos Pueblo, lost access to communityowned farming machinery and water resources because he refused to
engage in communal, religious services (US Congress, Senate 59–60). A
similar situation came before the Canadian Supreme Court in Thomas v
Norris, where the Salish tribal council punished a member for failing to
participate in a Spirit Dance (Tully, 1995: 172). Under these circumstances, how should democratic societies like Canada and the United
States address Native American practices which clearly contradict liberal
norms such as equality before the law and freedom of religion?
Frances Svennson, in her criticism of the ICRA extension of religious
liberties to quasi-theocratic nations like the Pueblos, argues that the need
to protect individual rights is based upon a liberal model of self-interested individualism. Such individualism fails both to place adequate
weight on the role of communities in the development of individual wellbeing and to respect the specific group ideals of the Pueblo. While recognizing that groups like the Pueblo may well stifle individual members
through their emphasis on community, she ultimately opposes extending norms protecting individual autonomy across cultural boundaries.
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Svennson believes that this dilemma can be resolved if stifled Pueblo individuals are free to leave the tribe and pursue individualistic life-styles
within the broader society. For her, this is a lesser injustice than imposing dominant societal norms upon a smaller community (Svennson,
1979: 435–7). Svennson’s argument is far less convincing, however,
when we consider Michael McDonald’s claim that individuals brought
up within highly traditional societies possess world-views shaped by
norms which are not individually chosen. According to McDonald,
expulsion from a community will be more harmful for such individuals
than for those raised in societies whose norms are based more upon
choice (McDonald, 1986: 43). In effect, expulsion would be less damaging for a modern liberal individual than for a Pueblo individual.
Regarding religious intolerance and sexism, James Tully suggests
that these problems need not be intractable if we examine the intrinsic
characteristics of native cultures. For instance, he cites approvingly the
Canadian Supreme Court opinion in Thomas v Norris, which held that
the involuntary character of the Spirit Dance was not an intrinsic part
of Salish culture and hence punishing non-participation was unconstitutional (Tully, 1995: 172). Regarding gender inequality, Tully believes
that, because patrilineal succession first emerged through the imposition
of Canada’s Indian Act, the re-establishment of tribal sovereignty will
enable native peoples to overcome sexism by resuscitating their own,
non-sexist traditions (Tully, 1995: 193). Yet Tully’s argument fails on
both accounts. First, regarding Thomas v Norris, one must ask who can
more validly ascertain what is essential to Salish culture – the Canadian
Supreme Court, a body dominated by Canadians of European descent,
or the Salish tribal council? Second, while Tully correctly notes that
patrilineal succession may not have been a traditional practice among
several Canadian tribes and the Santa Clara Pueblo (McDonald, 1986:
27 and Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 133), one cannot assume that Native
American tribes will automatically return to their non-sexist ways once
given sovereignty. Santa Clara Pueblo was heard in 1977, a date 43 years
after the IRA re-established internal tribal sovereignty. So even if tribal
sexism is the result of the cultural colonization of native peoples, we
must heed Frank Pommersheim’s insight that the ‘process of decolonization can never lead back to a precolonized society’ (Pommersheim,
1995: 99). We cannot hope to turn back the clock on Indian–White
history. Liberal Americans and Canadians must address Native peoples
as they are today, without the expectation that they may somehow
become what they once may have been.
Kymlicka provides perhaps the most compelling response to these
issues. His theory cannot justify suppressing religious intolerance or
gender inequality within self-governing tribes, since a liberal theory of
minority group rights must be based upon a principle of individual
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autonomy. Such a liberal theory can uphold self-government rights for
cultural minorities in the form of ‘external protections’, legal and institutional measures which protect a disadvantaged, national minority
from ‘external decisions’ made by the majority culture. These measures
governing ‘inter-group relations’ between a majority and a minority
culture accord with liberal norms of egalitarian justice by enabling
Native peoples to govern using their own languages and to develop their
natural resources according to their own needs rather than the needs of
the broader community. In contrast, internal restrictions that govern
‘intra-group relations’ between a self-governing cultural community and
its individual members conflict with liberal norms of autonomy. So when
a tribal community treats women unequally or suppresses the religious
freedom of its members, it acts unjustly and deserves the criticism of
liberal theorists and political actors (Kymlicka, 1995: 35–8). Yet while
Kymlicka condemns the injustice of internal restrictions, he prohibits the
liberal state from coercively imposing liberal norms to counter them,
since national minorities, like sovereign states, ‘form distinct political
communities, with their own claims to self-government’, which liberals
must respect. Moreover, attempts to impose liberal principles upon such
self-governing communities are usually ineffective, since they are often
perceived as paternalistic interference (Kymlicka, 1995: 167). So Kymlicka will not condone illiberal internal restrictions, but he will also not
forcibly overcome them.
Still, Kymlicka does suggest three ways of overcoming illiberal injustices without state force. First, liberal reformers both within and outside
of this cultural community can morally criticize illiberal internal restrictions and work for their transformation. Second, other states can apply
economic incentives to encourage communities to change their ways.
Third, international bodies, such as human rights tribunals rather than
the American Supreme Court, can review these cases (Kymlicka, 1995:
168–9). Kymlicka concludes that interaction ‘between national groups
should be determined by dialogue. But if liberal theory is to contribute
anything to that dialogue, it is surely by spelling out the implications of
the liberal principles of freedom and equality. This is not the first step
down the road to interference. Rather, it is the first step in starting a dialogue’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 171; see also Kymlicka, 1992: 145).9
Yet there are problems with each of his solutions. For instance, the
use of an international review process means that either any decision will
be unenforceable or, as is the case in international relations, the terms
for enforcement will remain underspecified and open to relations of military power. Regarding economic incentives, Kymlicka himself acknowledges that the ‘line between incentives and coercion is not a sharp one’,
since an economically powerful cultural minority could effectively crush
such small, poor minorities as Native peoples (Kymlicka, 1995: 168).
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Finally, with respect to moral criticism, Kymlicka does not specify the
manner or conditions under which intercultural criticism ought to occur.
How do we distinguish egalitarian intercultural criticism from pseudocriticism marked by the exercise of state or economic coercion? How do
we judge mutual, reciprocal criticism from the propagation of unfair
stereotypes? And, for that matter, where does intercultural criticism
occur? In Parliament, or on the street? Only in face-to-face encounters,
or also through print and electronic media? These questions remain
unanswered in Kymlicka’s theory because he fails to theorize adequately
the dynamics of dialogue among cultures. He impressively articulates a
liberal theory that can support notions of tribal sovereignty, yet his
liberal framework fails to indicate how we can non-coercively convince
members of other cultures to adopt the norms and practices necessary
for an egalitarian democracy that values individual autonomy. Kymlicka
takes us one step towards an intercultural dialogue: a discursive theory
of cultural pluralism can take us further.

II Universality amidst diversity: Habermasian discourse and
cultural pluralism
Because contemporary theorists have insufficiently analyzed normative
dialogue across cultural boundaries, I turn to Habermas’ conception of
moral discourse10 in order to articulate a universalist approach to democratic cultural pluralism. As is well known, the central component of
Habermas’ theory is the discourse principle, which is given as follows:
Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons
could agree as participants in rational discourses. (Habermas, 1996: 107)

He then defines a ‘rational discourse’ as an attempt to reach an understanding over disputed claims, so long as this attempt ‘takes place under
conditions of communication that enable the free processing of topics
and contributions, information and reasons in the public space constituted by illocutionary obligations’, or modes of convincing each other
which preclude the exercise of force or deception (Habermas, 1996:
108). These brief statements provide the kernel to a discursive theory of
democracy that both is universalistic in form and yet allows for a broad
diversity of cultural contents. This formal universality amidst cultural
diversity stems from Habermas’ neo-Kantian approach, which understands norms not as values constitutive to one’s personal fulfillment but
as ‘generalized behavioral expectations’, or ways of regulating action
among multiple individuals (Habermas, 1996: 107). Under this theory,
norms which diverge widely among cultural groups can nevertheless be
considered legitimate so long as they meet three requirements pertaining
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to universal participation, the impartial moral point of view, and conditions of fairness (see Habermas, 1996: 182).
The first requirement – universal participation – holds that a norm
can only be considered valid, or worthy of being obeyed, if all individuals whose interests will be affected by it are permitted to participate
in its formation. This requirement illustrates the strong participatory
dimension to Habermas’ theory. Indeed, it is political participation, or
public autonomy, not simply the legal form taken by various laws, which
grounds legitimacy. Furthermore, Habermas emphasizes that norms gain
rational legitimacy through discursive participation, involving rigorous
debate and discussion. Simply aggregating individual preferences
through voting procedures is insufficient for the rational creation of
legitimate norms (Habermas, 1990: 91; Habermas, 1996: 181–3).
This brings us to the second requirement, the discursive achievement
of the impartial moral point of view. For Habermas, impartiality implies
that a norm is good for all, not merely good for some. Such impartiality not only requires the universal participation of all potentially affected
parties: it also requires participants to orient themselves universalistically, by coming to understand the positions of others while questioning
their own positions. This, in turn, can emerge only through actual
debates, where actors are challenged and confronted by others. In this
way, actors can come to justify norms through consensus [Einverständnis] and not merely compromise. Within a compromise, parties seek only
to maximize their own interests via the acquiescence of others. Within
a rational consensus, parties question their own interests and viewpoints, attempt to understand the interests and viewpoints of others, and
ultimately agree to the norm for the same reasons. It is precisely through
the rigor of discursively taking the role of the other that practical discourses approach impartiality (Habermas, 1990: 62–76; Habermas,
1996: 166).
Third, and finally, the discourses under which all participants are to
agree to a norm must at least approximate conditions of fairness. These
conditions are of two types. First, conditions must allow participants to
say whatever they want, so long as they do so sincerely and without
attempting to deceive or manipulate others. Second, participants must
not coerce others through internal force or external threats of force. Such
relations of power can only be overcome if, within discursive settings of
norm creation, substantial levels of material equality are achieved.
Habermas understands these rules of sincere discursive reciprocity and
equality as presupposed within the practice of argumentation, a practice
central to modern forms of communicative interaction (Habermas,
1990: 87–9).
These, then, are the formal criteria for the justification of a norm:
legitimate norms must be consensually justified by all affected parties
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through a rational, moral discourse conducted under fair conditions.
However, the substantive content of norms is not specified within Habermas’ theory and hence can vary according to culture (Habermas, 1990:
103). So if, under fair conditions, all members of one culture agree to
punish murder through life imprisonment while under similarly fair conditions members of another culture agree to punish murder by compensating the victim’s family, then both forms of punishment are valid. The
formal conditions under which the norm was created, not the specific
content of the norm itself, is what Habermas’ theory evaluates. And it
is these conditions of fair, rational, normative consensus that provide the
universalistic form for culturally diverse substantive norms.
To this extent, while Habermas’ theory defends formal universality
amidst substantive cultural diversity, it does not appear to go beyond
Kymlicka’s liberal formulation. For instance, Kymlicka’s distinction
between justified external protections versus unjustified internal restrictions rests upon a prior distinction between cultural structure and cultural character. Cultural structure describes the thinner, more formal
aspects of a culture, such as language and a shared history, which
provide the context for autonomous individual choices. Cultural character describes the substantive norms or values held by a culture (Kymlicka, 1989: 166–7).11 Liberals can justify external protections which
maintain the structure of a culture, but need not justify maintaining the
substantive character of a culture, especially when it supports internal
restrictions contrary to liberal autonomy. So, to take the case of Santa
Clara Pueblo, liberals should seek to protect the Pueblo cultural structure while liberalizing the community’s substantive cultural character
regarding gender relations. Hence, both Kymlicka and Habermas will
allow for cultural diversity only within certain formally universalistic
boundaries which reflect notions of individual autonomy.
Habermasian formal universalism differs from Kymlicka, however,
in its greater emphasis on public autonomy, or the participatory formation of legitimate norms, as opposed to only private autonomy, or
the uninhibited individual pursuit of personal ends. For Kymlicka, a
liberal theory of minority rights precludes internal restrictions through
its defence of private autonomy, or ‘the idea that individuals should be
free to assess and potentially revise their existing ends’ (Kymlicka, 1995:
158). While Habermas supports this protection of private autonomy, he
nevertheless is concerned to balance it with an equal emphasis on public
autonomy, particularly when one’s exercise of private autonomy conflicts with that of others (see Habermas, 1996: 118–19). Hence, at issue
within discursive formal universality is not merely the form taken by
substantive norms: as important is the requirement that legal norms be
created actively and discursively under fair conditions. In this way,
Habermas’ theory not only addresses how liberals grant certain rights
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to minority cultures: it is equally concerned with enabling cultural
groups to participate actively within a robustly democratic society. Since
cultural minorities have rarely achieved advances except through
struggle and political action, steps must be taken to encourage such
emancipatory participation.
Habermas’ emphasis on universality through public autonomy
enables him to address more adequately critics who often level four
charges at universalistic approaches to cultural pluralism. First, universalistic approaches are said to emphasize equality through ‘color-blind’
norms uniformly applicable to all, regardless of cultural situation.
Second, they tend to constrain public deliberation to ‘neutral’, noncontroversial themes already shared by all cultural groups. Third, they
supposedly emphasize impartiality to a point that risks promoting the
good for privileged groups to the exclusion of the interests of marginalized groups. Finally, they overlook power relations among cultural
groups. I argue, however, that Habermas’ position can adequately
address all of these criticisms.

Discursive universality versus color-blind uniformity
To address this first criticism, one must carefully distinguish Habermasian ‘universality’ from any notion of legal or normative ‘uniformity’.
While the term ‘universality’ is often used to mean uniformity,12 for
Habermas it is the participation, the impartial perspective and the assent
of all affected that grounds a norm’s universality. The specific norms
justified in this way, however, can potentially have a content that treats
people differently, according to their different circumstances. Hence,
group specific differential policies, like affirmative action or tribal sovereignty, can be legitimate, so long as they gain the assent of all parties
affected (see Habermas, 1994: 128–9). Indeed, any truly rational and
moral opposition to such policies would require opponents to be directly
confronted with the viewpoints of oppressed groups. Opponents must
then remain convinced that such differential policies are not in the best
interests of all affected parties, including those who desire them.

Discursive universality versus neutrality
The contention that universalistic approaches to cultural pluralism constrain public dialogue to neutral themes is more applicable to liberal
theorists than to Habermas. Liberal models of public deliberation
advise the diverse groups in a pluralistic society to constrain their
common public deliberations to those shared values and beliefs which
constitute neutral public ground. In turn, controversial cultural beliefs
must be kept within the private sphere, where they may indeed animate
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individual life-plans.13 Clearly this differs from Habermas’ position that
rational discourse must allow for the ‘free processing of themes, contributions, information, and reasons’ (Habermas, 1996: 107–8). Indeed,
because thematic constraints could potentially distort discourse as
much as internal or external coercion, Habermasian discourse would
encourage marginalized cultural groups to press for controversial
claims while participating in arenas of norm legitimation. Liberals
might convincingly respond that this would hinder efficient decisionmaking and increase intercultural conflict within public debate. And
moreover, since many cultural groups mainly wish to maintain their cultural practices without outside interference, it might be more tolerant
to keep controversial cultural issues out of public debate. To some
extent, these rejoinders are clearly correct, but they tell only half of the
story. For while it may be advantageous that certain culture-specific
topics be excluded from the public domain, we must carefully examine
how these exclusions develop and are justified.
First, one must note that there is a wide gulf between public debate
and state action. Within the informal public sphere and even parliamentary assemblies, political actors may discuss a wide range of issues
which never become privy to state regulation. Hence, there is no reason
to suspect that unconstrained public debate need become unconstrained
state action.14 And indeed, unconstrained discourse in a pluralistic
society may also lead to agreements to constrain state action in many
areas. Second, one must recognize that highly controversial claims
cannot be expected to gain broader consensus unless they appeal to
reasons which others can understand. Hence, cultural groups must be
able to put their claims in universalizable terms. For instance, they must
express their demands in terms of entitlements which they are justly due
and not simply in terms of desires. Yet in stating their case, cultural
groups can nevertheless introduce cultural beliefs or concepts which are
not shared by the broader community, in the hope that these beliefs and
concepts may become more comprehensible to others. Indeed, in cases
of deep cultural diversity it is unlikely that the neutral ground of shared
values will be found. Hence, if any public debate is to occur at all, it
must occur through the introduction of themes that will be controversial
to one or more of the parties involved. Third, one must clearly distinguish how issues are taken out of public dialogue. Are issues excluded
from public debate right from the start, or do actors come to agree that
an issue is best left off the table? While the former case clearly contradicts Habermas’ model of rational discourse, the latter need not. As
Simone Chambers notes, rational discourse may lead to rational disagreement as well as rational agreement. After the course of a rational
discourse, one open to all possible themes, questions and suggestions,
participants may well agree to disagree. But such a disagreement would
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be rational, whereas discursive disagreements which precluded themes
from the start would not be (Chambers, 1995: 240).
For these reasons, a viable conception of an intercultural public
sphere should allow for thematically unconstrained communication. For
as Seyla Benhabib remarks, many marginalized groups, such as women
and cultural or ethnic minorities, gained admittance into the public
sphere only by pressing claims that once appeared controversial (Benhabib, 1989: 154). Controversial contributions to debate within an
intercultural public sphere might not immediately gain adherents within
the wider society. Indeed, it is likely that in order to gain broader acceptance, initially controversial contributions will have to emphasize their
similarities to other concepts already accepted within public debate. Yet
we must also leave open the possibility that initially controversial cultural viewpoints may eventually gain the assent or at least the respect of
others. And in either case, these possibilities remain only if the intercultural public sphere remains open to all possible themes and contributions.

Discursive impartiality and false universality
To address this criticism,15 one must note that Habermasian impartiality is not a ‘view from nowhere’, to use the felicitous phrase of Nagel
(1986). Rather, discursive impartiality results from gaining the widest
possible perspective on a norm. Hence, Habermas seeks to avoid ‘false
universality’, the circumstance when a purportedly impartial norm represents not the good for all but the good for a privileged few, through
discourses engaging the widest possible spectrum of interests and viewpoints. Because the impartial moral point of view aims at norms to
which all could freely agree, it requires each to take the perspective of
all others. Moreover, because discursive impartiality is best achieved by
actually engaging others, it may require guaranteeing the representation
of marginalized groups within the discursive arenas of norm formation.
In this way, political dialogue can take into account the widest spectrum
of perspectives of those affected by a norm, including the self-understanding and world-understanding of marginal groups (Habermas,
1996: 181–3).
Note, however, that such guaranteed representation aims not simply
at aggregating the preferences of different cultural groups but at gaining
a moral perspective by challenging the viewpoints of all parties. Hence,
representation aimed at gaining an impartial, moral point of view within
discursive bodies need not reflect numerical proportions within the
population at large. So, for instance, representation aimed at generating
a moral point of view could require equal numbers of representatives of
all cultural groups, even though one cultural group may be far larger
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than all the others combined. The goal is a rational, moral consensus,
not a compromise gained by balancing the aggregated preferences of
different groups.

Discursive universality and the problem of power
Finally, a focus on public autonomy and the active participation of cultural groups in the formation of norms requires a careful analysis of
power. Habermas distinguishes three forms of power: administrative
power; social power; and communicative power. Administrative power
is defined as the state’s ability to execute and enforce laws (Habermas,
1996: 136). In turn, social power reflects an individual’s capacity to exercise his or her will in opposition to that of others, a capacity facilitated
by access to material resources (Habermas, 1996: 175). Finally, drawing
on Hannah Arendt, Habermas portrays communicative power as the
volitional power generated by citizens acting in concert. This power
creates or renews shared beliefs, which motivate actors, allowing them
to exert influence upon official institutions (Habermas, 1996: 146–51).
Habermas goes a step further, however, and holds that communicative
power, if it is channeled into the discursive formation of legitimate laws,
can be transformed into the administrative power of the state. But,
following his analysis of rational discourse, communicative power can
generate legitimate administrative power only if relations of social
power are neutralized within arenas of law and norm formation. Hence,
a just and legitimate democratic society must take steps to enable the
fair and equal participation of economically and politically marginalized
cultural groups within arenas where norms and laws are created (Habermas, 1996: 150).
Yet is Habermas’ conception of power adequate? According to Dana
Villa, Habermas’ emphasis on the creation of legitimate norms through
power-free discourse overlooks modern, disciplinary power. For Habermas social power is overcome when relations among public actors are
non-hierarchical and symmetrical. Foucault, however, shows how
socially equal actors can nevertheless exert normalizing, disciplinary
power through non-hierarchical, egalitarian means. Moreover, Villa suggests that the model of ‘coercion-free’ discourse can itself facilitate the
egalitarian domination of individuals and thus advocates Arendt’s model
of agonistic public action to better preserve real diversity amidst modern,
normalizing pressures (Villa, 1992: 714–15 and 717–18). Iris Marion
Young, on the other hand, criticizes Habermas’ overly agonistic portrayal of rational communication. By focusing on how economic or state
power can distort public communication, Habermas overlooks the distorting cultural power preserved within a model of rational argumentation understood as a ‘competition with arguments’ (Young, 1996: 133–4
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[n. 8] and 123). Because the argumentative model of rational discourse
is culturally biased against women and members of some minority
groups, it embeds within itself a form of cultural power.
Interestingly, then, Young and Villa criticize Habermas from opposite sides of the agonistic coin. And to some extent, both are correct. But
while Habermas’ conception of power does fail to analyze adequately
cultural or non-hierarchical forms of power, the crucial question for our
purposes is whether agonistic public discourse threatens or protects cultural diversity. For Habermas, the political actor does agonistically test
the substantive values and norms held by cultural or political communities. Yet this agonistic testing is tamed by formal rules of argumentation precluding the use of social power, deception and thematic
constraints. However, does this taming of agonism rob modern subjects
of their best weapon for fighting the normalizing forces of disciplinary
power? Perhaps. But critics must consider whether agonistic subjectivity is always salutary and whether it culturally dominates the less agonistic. To this extent, Young’s criticism is as validly leveled against
Arendtians and Nietzscheans as against Habermas. But while I find
Young’s concerns valid, I do not think that the agonistic and argumentative testing of cultural values should be overcome entirely within an
intercultural public sphere. Young reminds us that participants in an
intercultural public sphere should begin generously, trying first to understand and learn from the cultural others whom they encounter. Yet at
some point these cultural others may well espouse beliefs or values that
ought to be tested, criticized and overcome. Difference and diversity, as
we learn in cases like Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez and Thomas v
Norris, need not always be celebrated. And to the extent that this is the
case, the concern to create and justify legitimate norms for adjudicating
cultural conflict is well founded.
While Habermas’ emphasis on discursive public autonomy can withstand these four criticisms of universalistic approaches to cultural pluralism, we must recognize where it meets greater resistance. For the
discursive response to each of the above criticisms presupposes the validity of an impartial, universalistic, moral point of view. But what happens
when a culture denies the validity of the discursive, moral point of view
in the first place? Has Habermas committed the ethnocentric fallacy,
whereby the rules of moral argumentation turn out to be mere conventions of Western cultures?
On the one hand, Habermas responds to the ethnocentric fallacy
through the transcendental-pragmatic performative contradiction. This
contends that, when an individual engages in an argument while denying
the very rules that underlie it, that individual’s deeds effectively
contradict his or her words (Habermas, 1990: 78–82). On the other
hand, Habermas acknowledges that rules of moral argumentation are
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historically bound to the world-views of modern individuals. Moral
argumentation is a modern practice. Thus, only modern individuals are
intuitively aware that they cannot really win an argument by deceiving
the other person or holding a gun to his or her head. Arguments are won
by the force of the better argument alone, not by physical force or deception. Moreover, members of modern societies possess a moral consciousness that understands justice in terms of impartiality, by taking the
role of others. This normative framework is incompatible with traditional cultures that hold closed-off religious or metaphysical worldviews, including the fundamentalist world-views found in the United
States (Habermas, 1990: 87; Habermas, 1996: 371; White, 1988: 57–8).
In these cases, Habermas would argue that individuals would be either
unwilling or unable to question their own interests and perspectives and
hence would be unable to adopt the form of impartiality necessary for
participation within moral discourse. Have we now reached the proverbial brick wall against which a discursive, universalist theory must
run?
To some extent, this may well be the case. Should a group steadfastly
refuse to engage in moral discourse with members of other cultures, then
there is little that a Habermasian theory of cultural pluralism can do.
When this is the case, then perhaps we must watch helplessly as other
cultures commit undemocratic injustices, taking care to protect ourselves
from similar injustices. But the need to resort to a modus vivendi applies
only to extreme cases. Furthermore, a commitment to discursive public
autonomy compels members of democratic societies to attempt to
engage members of apparently undemocratic cultures: for any norm
which may apply to these cultures, even a norm which grants them the
right to be left alone, is only fully legitimate if it has been discursively
justified through a rational discourse. And when one moves beyond the
extreme case of groups that refuse all dialogue, one learns that many of
the groups whose practices are considered illiberal or undemocratic are
nevertheless willing to engage in some sort of discursive interaction with
members of the broader liberal-democratic society. This is clearly the
case with many Pueblo communities like the one dealt with in Santa
Clara Pueblo. Pueblo representatives have taken part in various discursive fora regarding laws and policies which would affect their interests
(see US Congress, Senate, 10–15). And with this willingness to engage
in dialogue comes the opportunity not simply to impose democratic
norms upon undemocratic peoples but to engage in the mutual learning
and mutual critique that occur within fair intercultural communication.
Through gentle but probing intercultural discourse, norms that are
accepted broadly within the liberal democratic society may gradually
become amenable to groups that are to varying degrees illiberal. But
where and under what conditions are such intercultural discourses to
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take place? In order to address these questions better, we should turn to
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, ‘the sociological correlate to the
discursive concept of legitimacy’ (Benhabib, 1992: 103).

III Towards an intercultural public sphere
For Habermas’ theory of discourse to inform democratic cultural pluralism, a clear understanding of the public sphere is necessary. Habermas
distinguishes the public sphere from any specific social system, institution, or organization, including the state, the legislature, or unions.
Instead, the public sphere is described as a ‘network for communicating
information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or
negative attitudes)’ (Habermas, 1996: 360). This ‘decentered’ carrier of
the public opinions held by everyday individuals, not professional politicians or technical experts, thus reflects societal agreements as they
develop within the populace at large.
Yet are there really society-wide agreements to be analyzed? Clearly
not, if one means a single agreement, reached at the end of one conversation, over one specific issue, at one specific point in time. Yet, as Chambers suggests, the notion of societal agreement makes more sense if we
consider broad societal trends over the course of multiple, criss-crossing
arguments. Over time, a ‘general agreement may emerge as the product
of many single conversations, even when no single conversation ends in
agreement’ (Chambers, 1995: 250). These general, societal agreements
anchor new social norms within the political culture. And as Kymlicka
and Chambers both note, it is changes at this level, not the imposition
of laws or judicial decisions, that will strengthen norms for respecting
individual autonomy and cultural differences (Kymlicka, 1995: 167;
Chambers, 1996: 235–43).
Chambers’ notion of general societal agreement corresponds to
Habermas’ distinction between different types of publics: episodic; occasional; and abstract (Habermas, 1996: 374). Episodic publics describe
those everyday encounters where two or more individuals discuss topics
of public concern. Be it riders on the subway or patrons of a tavern, individuals can engage in the discursive testing of norms and the formation
of collective opinions in this very unstructured and informal manner.
More formal and planned occasional publics are exemplified by theaters,
assemblies, town meetings, or presentations. Not just the proverbial
town-hall meeting but even a dance performance dealing with politicized
issues such as gender or sexuality can contribute to an ongoing public
discussion that, at one moment, takes place within an occasional public.
Finally, abstract publics further connote the breadth, the open-endedness, and the gradual development of societal agreement. In abstract
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publics, geographically dispersed participants are connected only
through the electronic or print media. Watching TV, ‘chatting’ on the
Internet, or reading magazines, all contribute to the testing of norms and
the formation of opinions within the public sphere (Habermas, 1996:
374). The public sphere, then, is not just a small group of people gathering together in a confined space: it is the web of communication that
can permeate even a society of 280 million.
The distinction between different publics and the notion of general
societal agreement are crucial components of an intercultural public
sphere. For as Frank Pommersheim notes, intercultural publics involving direct, face-to-face encounters between Native and non-Native
Americans are few and far between (Pommersheim, 1995: 158). Yet a
multi-level, more flexible conception of the public sphere enables us to
analyze the extent to which more indirect forms of communication –
through tribal institutions, through the media, or through habitual conversation – encourage more or less egalitarian and reciprocal interactions among cultural groups. Indeed, this more flexible framework
accommodates Nancy Fraser’s trenchant criticism of Habermas’ earlier
inclination to favor a broader, more unified public sphere over smaller,
more particular publics (see Habermas, 1989). Fraser notes that subaltern publics, open only to subgroups within society, may be worthwhile
either in socially stratified societies or in a (hypothetically constructed)
culturally diverse, egalitarian society. Within a stratified society, subaltern publics enable their members to develop discursive capacities under
conditions shielded from the pressures of dominant groups. In a culturally diverse, egalitarian society, smaller publics allow their members to
maintain their cultural identities apart from the culturally specific, discursive practices of the dominant culture (Fraser, 1992: 121–8). Given
that relations between Native and non-Native Americans may be characterized as socially stratified and culturally diverse, subaltern publics are
key to realizing the democratic potential of an intercultural public
sphere.
Now, Fraser is keenly aware of the potential problems raised by
defending subaltern publics. For instance, subaltern publics may contribute to entropic tendencies within society, as members of groups
associate with each other rather than with members of other groups. In
response, she carefully distinguishes between subaltern publics, which
communicate with the broader public sphere to counter the injustices
that they suffer, and subaltern enclaves, which sever all connections with
the broader public sphere. Subaltern publics, not subaltern enclaves,
support the ideals of a democratic public sphere. Fraser also acknowledges that subaltern publics, in protecting themselves from the dominant social group or culture, may well exercise their own form of social
power over their individual members (Fraser, 1992: 124). Yet such
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repressive characteristics can be countered by critique exercised by other
publics, either subaltern or otherwise, within the public sphere.
While the public sphere, then, need not imply a small group of
people within a closely confined space, Habermas also adamantly distinguishes strong publics – democratic decision-making institutions, like
legislatures – from weak publics – sites of discussion where individuals
develop opinions while freed from the necessity to make binding political decisions. For Habermas, only weak publics carry authentic public
opinion (Habermas, 1996: 307–8). But while weak and strong publics
are clearly distinct, they are not completely unconnected. As authentic
carriers of public opinion, weak publics can still exert ‘influence’ upon
decision-making bodies. Furthermore, Habermas draws on his theory of
discourse to argue that weak publics exert legitimate influence only to
the extent that they approximate fair conditions free of coercion and
conversational constraints. Whenever thematic constraints or relations
of social power creep into the public sphere, the veracity [Glaubwürdigkeit] of its opinion and the legitimacy of its influence decline
(Habermas, 1996: 362–3).
But how worthwhile is Habermas’ sharp distinction between weak
and strong publics? According to Fraser, this sharp distinction conceptually excludes from the authentic public sphere many radically democratic self-managing institutions – such as democratic workplaces,
child-care centers, and residential organizations – which engage in decision-making as well as discussion, but which nevertheless aid in
developing authentic public opinion (Fraser, 1992: 132–6). Now, while
Fraser’s point is well taken, we must note that the pressure to come to
a decision can transform discourse in important ways. As Chambers
reminds us, because consensus-oriented discourse is a highly inefficient
form of decision-making, decisions within participatory bodies are more
likely to come about through strategic compromise than rational consensus (Chambers, 1995: 250–5). As a result, the small, directly democratic strong publics that Fraser admires may fail to achieve certain goals
entailed within discursive consensus, like the thorough testing of one’s
interests and viewpoints, the attempt to understand the interests and
viewpoints of others, and agreement on norms for the same reasons.
Strong publics may be democratic, but as decision-making bodies, we
might expect these democracies to be more strategic than discursive.
Still, we need not reject the contributions of strong publics from an
authentic public sphere, since Habermas himself encounters great difficulty in identifying actual weak publics that satisfy his criteria for authenticity. For instance, he tries to distinguish authentic public actors
from inauthentic interest groups through Bernard Peters’ categories of
clientele-customer groups – interest groups aimed at gaining beneficial
state outputs – and supplier groups – groups which influence the state
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by proposing new policies. However, this distinction neglects how interest groups influence actual policy-making, a problem which Habermas
himself admits (Habermas, 1996: 355). He then suggests that authentic
actors ‘emerge from’ the public sphere itself and depend upon financial
‘sponsors’ who ‘do not necessarily reduce the authenticity of the actors
they represent’ (Habermas, 1996: 375). These contrast with pre-existing
interest groups, which already exist within the political system and
possess material and organizational resources that represent means of
social power. Such inauthentic pre-existing groups proffer ‘public
opinions that can acquire visibility only because of an undeclared infusion of money or organizational power’, and hence ‘lose their credibility as soon as these sources of social power are made public’. He then
concludes that ‘contributions of interest groups are, in any case, vulnerable to a kind of criticism to which contributions from other sources are
not exposed’ (Habermas, 1996: 364). Yet this ideal-typical example is
also less convincing when one considers the health insurance lobby’s torpedoing of health care reform. People knew where these ads were
coming from, but they still bought into them.
Cohen and Arato’s notion of ‘dual orientation’ provides the most
promising framework for identifying authentic public sphere groups.
Authentic public actors, especially ‘new social movements’, pursue both
offensive aims – whereby they influence the political system by supplying information, raising relevant issues, defining problems, and proposing solutions – and defensive aims – whereby they seek to defend the
discursive, public way of life itself. By protecting the public sphere, maintaining existing structures of communication, generating counterpublics, expanding rights, and reforming institutions, new social
movements distinguish themselves from interest groups (Cohen and
Arato, 1992: 531). However, it is not clear that organizations with
decision-making powers cannot also embody such a dual orientation.
Indeed, I shall argue in the next section that at least some decisionmaking tribal institutions do so.
To conclude this section, let me briefly review the three broad elements of a theory of the intercultural public sphere. First, the intercultural public sphere accommodates substantive cultural diversity within
the parameters of formal universality. Norms may embody diverse cultural substance, but the formal criteria for the legitimate creation of a
norm should, as much as possible, satisfy discursive conditions of fairness. While these conditions are themselves open to ongoing discursive
interpretation and reinterpretation, they remain broadly valid working
rules for understanding the formation of legitimate norms.
Second, I hold that these conditions for legitimate norm formation,
because they regulate the exercise of public autonomy, avoid four problems commonly associated with universalistic approaches to cultural
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pluralism. (1) A theory of public autonomy allows for flexibility in creating context-sensitive policies aimed at accommodating the specific
challenges faced by marginalized cultural groups. (2) It also encourages
the widest possible spectrum of conversation by resolutely avoiding thematic constraints. (3) This theory addresses the problem of false universality through, if need be, the guaranteed representation of
marginalized groups within discursive fora of norm formation. (4) This
theory focuses attention on relations of social power among cultural
groups, even when such relations entail cultural power embedded in
ways of communicating.
Finally, I hold that the intercultural public sphere must seek to
promote, gradually but persistently, mutual learning and mutual criticism among cultural groups. In service of these aims, I hold that an
authentic intercultural public sphere may include subaltern publics,
which comprise only members of specific cultural groups, and strong
publics, which have decision-making powers. Moreover, to the extent
that illiberal groups exercise public autonomy within the public sphere,
chances improve that they can contribute to the gradual development of
‘general agreements’ on norms that can govern their relations among
their own members and between their community and the broader
liberal-democratic community. Yet their participation within the public
sphere will come at the risk that other cultural groups will not only learn
from their cultural practices but also criticize and perhaps condemn
them. This risk is justified, however, to the extent that the intercultural
public sphere can allow for culturally diverse norms within formally universal rules, encourage unconstrained and controversial intercultural
dialogue, avoid false universality and overcome relations of social and
cultural power.

IV Tribal sovereignty and the intercultural public sphere
At the beginning of this paper, I noted that contemporary theorists of
cultural pluralism have examined tribal sovereignty primarily in terms
of protecting threatened Native cultures. While this emphasis is understandable, given the history of Anglo-Native relations in North America,
I have argued that a universalist theory of democratic cultural pluralism
can elucidate how tribal sovereignty contributes to the fair accommodation of cultural conflict. In this section, I return my focus to the issue
of tribal sovereignty, in order to show how a theory of an intercultural
public sphere would analyze the possibilities and problems encountered
by the devolution of political power to subaltern, decision-making tribal
publics. I will begin by examining how a focus on formal universality
amidst cultural diversity addresses tribal sovereignty. Then, I will show
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how a focus on public autonomy avoids the four problems which plague
universalist theories of cultural pluralism. Finally, I will illustrate the
extent to which tribal sovereignty fosters fair conditions for mutual
learning and mutual critique among Native and non-Native communities.
To understand tribal sovereignty in terms of the persistence of formal
universality amidst cultural diversity brings new issues to the forefront
of pluralist theory. A discursive theory of cultural pluralism will place
less emphasis on the content of specific laws or norms adopted by cultural communities and greater emphasis on the conditions under which
these laws have been created. Let me illustrate this distinction through
two issues connected with tribal sovereignty: criminal punishment and
patrilineal succession.
Regarding criminal punishment, many commentators note that
Native communities tend to place relatively little importance on attributing guilt and punishing perpetrators of crimes. Tribal courts, both in
the past and in the present, have sought and seek primarily to mediate
disputes. Often this requires compensating the victim, but such compensation should not prevent the perpetrator from living within the community and could even come from the personal possessions of the chief
or mediating elder. A stark example of this non-adversarial approach is
provided by the events behind the US Supreme Court case Ex Parte
Crow Dog, wherein the court overturned the conviction in a federal
court of a Sioux man charged with murdering another Sioux. The
murder, which did occur, was originally settled according to Sioux
custom by compensating the victim’s family. The federal court took up
the case only when the neighboring Anglo community protested against
the apparently barbaric practice of materially compensating for murder
and demanded that the perpetrator be executed (see Ex Parte Crow Dog
(109 US 556 [1883]) and Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 168–9). While the
Supreme Court eventually overturned the conviction on jurisdictional
grounds, it is important to note how a discursive theory would place
greater concern upon whether and to what extent murder compensation
was able to gain the agreement under fair conditions among members
of a given Native community. That this form of punishment goes against
more common, modern forms of punishing felonies is of less significance.
To turn to the issue of patrilineal succession found in Santa Clara
Pueblo v Martinez, the fact that some Native communities may have
patrilineal forms of membership succession is less important than the
conditions under which such laws are adopted. If Native women are
willing, under fair conditions, to agree to patrilineal succession rules,
then this form of membership criteria would be acceptable. Indeed, since
many Native leaders defend patrilineal succession not through claims to
male superiority but through arguments regarding the need to control
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population growth on resource-poor reservations (McDonald, 1986:
25), it is not entirely inconceivable that women might agree to such laws.
On the other hand, the fact that Julia Martinez contested the patrilineal
succession ordinance leads us to suspect that there is no consensus but
a legitimation deficit regarding this issue. Moreover, the fact that Martinez faced the possibility of losing her children’s access to housing alerts
a discursive theory that norm formation on the Santa Clara Pueblo is
being conducted under conditions of potential coercion.
The emphasis on universality through the fair exercise of public
autonomy also allows a discursive theory of cultural pluralism to avoid
excessive uniformity and the need to constrain conversation to neutral
themes. Contra uniformity, the above examples illustrate how a discursive universalist theory can allow for a great deal of diversity in the
specific types of norms or laws adopted by self-governing cultural groups
like Native Americans. Contra neutrality, a discursive, universalist
theory of cultural pluralism can accommodate institutions of tribal sovereignty, like tribal courts, which often emphasize the spiritual dimension of language, a mode of speech that is ‘particularly significant within
tribal cultures but is viewed as almost anaethma in the dominant legal
culture’ (Pommersheim, 1995: 106–7). Allowing for a broad, thematically unconstrained form of dialogue can permit modern legal concepts
to be translated more meaningfully to at least some Native ears. Unless
communication can occur in such an unconstrained way, some Native
peoples may have to alter completely their ways of speaking in order to
abide by modern, secular forms of legal language.
The re-establishment of tribal sovereignty can help to overcome the
problem of false universality by guaranteeing tribal representation
within advisory and decision-making bodies. For example, Pommersheim suggests establishing commissions of Indian and non-Indian
experts to review tribal state-relations in western states. Such commissions should be supplemented by greater regional discourse on tribal
issues, since many reservations, natural resources and water supplies
transcend state boundaries (Pommersheim, 1995: 154, 160). Guaranteed tribal representation on such commissions does not merely reflect
differences among cultural groups: it can instead be defended in terms
of the development of a truly impartial moral point of view which takes
tribal perspectives into account in the development of norms, principles
and laws that affect their interests.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of applying a theory of the intercultural
public sphere to tribal sovereignty comes through its analysis of administrative, social or economic, and cultural power among Native and nonNative groups. Regarding administrative power, a theory of the
intercultural public sphere would refocus attention upon Congressional
plenary power, criticizing not simply its failure to accord formal equality
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to minority nations, as Kymlicka’s theory emphasizes, but also its contradiction of fair discursive conditions for the creation of legitimate
norms. Because administrative power can be legitimately exercised only
via laws established through coercion-free discourse, any binding agreements between Native and non-Native communities can only come
about through agreements made devoid of power relations. Hence, any
truly legitimate federal laws governing Native nations can only result
from a discursive legitimation process which precludes congressional
plenary power. Just as that state cannot exercise administrative power
to distort free communicative legitimation within an intracultural public
sphere, so too can the state not distort free communicative legitimation
within an intercultural public sphere. Plenary power, with its unilateral
capacities for state action without tribal consent, clearly contradicts the
discursive understanding of intercultural legitimation.
Regarding social or economic power, a theory of an intercultural
public sphere would remain suspicious of using economic incentives for
liberalizing illiberal cultures, a measure accepted by Kymlicka, albeit
with reservations. Such tactics would clearly embody relations of social
power, especially given the relative financial weakness of most Native
communities. With its rejection of social power in the creation of legitimate norms, a discursive approach to cultural pluralism would understand economic incentives as another distorting force within
intercultural discourse. In response, a discursive theory of the intercultural public sphere would advocate increasing the channels of communication between the non-Native society and those potentially
undemocratic Native communities.
But given the problem of cultural power, the intercultural public
sphere must also examine whether the channels of communication are
sufficiently sensitive to the communicative characteristics of members of
different cultural communities. Here, the contributions of subaltern,
strong publics become especially important. For example, sovereign
tribal courts counter relations of cultural power through the exclusion
of non-Native lawyers in favor of lay Native advocates. Tribal courts
take this step for several reasons. First, there are few Indian licensed
attorneys, and most non-Indian attorneys have little knowledge of tribal
customs, traditions, decision-making practices, and world-views.
Second, the adversarial and argumentative emphasis of Anglo-American
legal practice could deflect tribal courts from their primary goal of mediation. Third, many Native Americans tend to retreat in the face of white
authority figures, further hindering fair court proceedings. Finally,
because tribal judges often lack law degrees, since a knowledge of tribal
custom is sufficient to serve on a tribal bench, their relatively wide authority to interrogate witnesses, comment on evidence and present arguments could be undermined (Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 122, 149–51, and
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202). In all of these ways, the exclusion of members of the dominant
culture can aid in neutralizing cultural power within a subaltern, strong
public.
Yet such subaltern, strong publics need not preclude universalistically oriented communication within the broader intercultural public
sphere. Indeed, the subaltern, strong publics established by tribal sovereignty can enable fair communication among different cultural groups
within the intercultural public sphere. The fairness of such communication is crucial, since for years the dominant Anglo community has
proffered stereotypical and biased cultural communication towards
Native peoples. Only if fair conditions exist between the two communities can intercultural communication fairly embody mutual learning and
mutual critique. One crucial step towards achieving such fair conditions
is the repudiation of Congressional plenary power. Moreover, intercultural communication need not be precluded through the re-establishment of tribal sovereignty so long as fair communicative channels exist.
And indeed, within the framework of incomplete tribal sovereignty, such
communicative channels already exist for mutual intercultural learning
and critique.
With respect to mutual learning, Native and non-Native cultures
may discover admirable and beneficial traits in each other. Tribal peoples
can learn of the value of Anglo-American political and legal institutions
and concepts which place greater emphasis on individual autonomy. For
example, John Collier, the Interior Secretary largely responsible for the
IRA, believed that tribal sovereignty and constitutionalism could enable
Native peoples to experience new freedom through exposure to liberaldemocratic ideals (Cornell, 1988: 94). Deloria and Lytle, in turn, note
that tribal courts can beneficially use regularized Anglo-American legal
procedures even as they reject the focus on retribution in favor of community harmony and mediation (Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 203). Conversely, decreasing adversarial tendencies may be a valuable lesson which
our highly litigious society can learn from tribal courts.
With respect to mutual critique between the Native and non-Native
communities, one should note that intercultural criticism is not only a
means for undermining apparently oppressive cultural practices: the
potential for cultural critique also appears to be a prerequisite for taking
another culture seriously. For instance, Peter Berger detects a patronizing
attitude in attempts to preserve Native cultures as pristine museum artifacts instead of treating them as capable of change and growth (Berger,
1991: 150). And while a fair accommodation of Native cultures must certainly require an appreciation of the difficulties that they face in preserving themselves from non-Native oppression, fairness can avoid becoming
patronizing by openly acknowledging areas of moral and political disagreement and criticizing practices which appear problematic. Indeed,
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one might even say that learning from another culture requires not only
an open but also a potentially critical attitude (see Taylor, 1992: 62–73).
In light of the complex relationship between mutual learning and mutual
critique, let us take up the following examples.
Pommersheim notes that tribal court opinions can serve as a means
of educating the non-Indian population in the need to nurture and
protect subordinate cultures threatened by forces of assimilation (Pommersheim, 1995: 112). Part of this educative process demands that tribal
courts engage in greater narrative tasks, apart from the simple statement
of a judicial opinion. Pommersheim cites a recent opinion by the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals, which extensively discussed federal interference in the original drafting of the tribal constitution. Particularly troubling was a provision potentially limiting tribal
jurisdiction over cases involving non-Indians. In illuminating this
problem, this tribal court provided a counternarrative which may lead
federal and state institutions to reject such interference as contrary to
liberal-democratic notions of pluralism and self-determination. Pommersheim concludes: ‘This is not, however, to suggest that all the
problem or responsibility lies with the federal government, but only that
there is need for a new dialogue on the issues facing tribal courts’ (Pommersheim, 1995: 109).
Narrative can also play a greater role in opinions involving Native
peoples handed down by American and Canadian federal courts. For
instance, the Canadian Supreme Court, in R. v Sparrow, prefaced its
defense of Native fishing rights by recounting the injustices suffered by
Native peoples, in order to acknowledge ‘that as far as the Indians are
concerned, this was their country, and it was taken away from them’
(Berger, 1991: 154). In the opposite direction, American courts can use
judicial opinions to criticize tribal practices which do not adhere to
liberal precepts. For instance, while the court in Santa Clara Pueblo
denied itself jurisdiction regarding patrilineal membership criteria, it
could have made a declaratory statement announcing its substantive
disagreement with this policy. An example of such a declaratory statement can be found in Prigg v Pennsylvania, where Justice William
Story upheld the Fugitive Slave Act while also declaring slavery a ‘mere
municipal regulation’ devoid of any basis in natural law (cited in Storing,
1995: 135).
In all of these examples, intercultural communication is not eliminated through the institution of tribal sovereignty. Indeed, without the
re-establishment of sovereign tribal institutions, the tribal perspective
would not have been heard. More importantly, the strengthening of
tribal sovereignty has allowed for intercultural communication, mutual
learning and mutual critique to proceed under conditions that are fairer,
more equal and more reciprocal. Indeed, the greatest obstacle to fair
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intercultural communication is the persistence of federal plenary power.
Now, this does not mean that more and different sites of intercultural
communication need not be developed. But it does mean that the
strengthening of tribal sovereignty can help to ensure that intercultural
communication occurs under conditions that approximate the conditions of fairness required by an intercultural public sphere.

Conclusion
In this essay, I have tried to develop two broad positions. First, I articulated the theoretical conception of an intercultural public sphere in order
to defend a universalist, discursive approach to democratic cultural
pluralism. This universalist theory, through its emphasis on public
autonomy, can advocate protecting threatened cultures within formally
universalistic parameters while also avoiding four potential criticisms of
universalist theories. Second, I have used the framework of the intercultural public sphere to illustrate how tribal sovereignty is a key step in
realizing fair conditions for mutual learning and mutual critique among
Native and non-Native communities. Through these two broad positions, I argue that the idea of an intercultural public sphere fills an
important lacuna within contemporary theories of cultural pluralism,
which understand tribal sovereignty only in its capacity to protect threatened Native cultures and not in its capacity to promote fair but potentially critical intercultural communication.
Bucknell University, Department of Political Science, Lewisburg, PA,
USA
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discussions of broader issues related to this essay, the author also wishes to
thank Johnny Goldfinger and Nicole Tronzano Speletic.
1 For Young, tribal sovereignty is critical for overcoming the oppression of
Native Americans, since uniform, individual-based rights to legal equality
fail to counter the invidious forms of oppression suffered by marginal
groups, whose cultural identities differ from the Western, white male ideal.
For Tully, tribal sovereignty helps to realize the three ‘conventions’ for a
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just accommodation of distinct cultures: the mutual recognition of a
cultural group’s sovereignty, the consent of each cultural group to a given
form of rule, and the preservation of continuity with a cultural group’s past
and future traditions (Tully, 1995: 116–23). For Kymlicka, tribal sovereignty assists individuals within such disadvantaged ‘national minorities’ to
make autonomous life-choices from among an array of culturally meaningful life-plans (Kymlicka, 1995: 82–4 and 108–15). Hence, all three thinkers
uphold tribal sovereignty as decisive in actualizing democratic ideas of
justice within a culturally pluralistic society.
See especially Young, 1990: 10 and Chapter 4; and Tully, 1995: 131.
On land-holding, see Burnett, 1972: 569–70; Cornell, 1988: 123–4; and
Pommersheim, 1995: 23. On religion and language, see Berger, 1991: 103;
Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 115 and 231–2; and Pommersheim, 1995: 21.
Plenary power emerged in the case Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, where the court
held that Congress could unilaterally abrogate a treaty with the Kiowa and
Comanche tribes requiring the assent of three-quarters of Indian males prior
to further acquisition of tribal land. See Lone Wolf v Hitchcock (187 US
553 [1903]) and Pommersheim, 1995: 46–7.
The Marshall Trilogy consists of the cases Johnson v McIntosh (21 US [8
Wheat.] 543 [1823]), Cherokee Nation v Georgia (30 US [5 Pet.] 1 [1831],
and Worcester v Georgia (31 US [6 Pet.] 515 [1832]). In these cases, Chief
Justice John Marshall sought both to address the status of Native Americans
within the newly formed American republic and to reconcile the rule of law
with the fact of American military conquest. Because of the Constitution’s
almost complete silence regarding Native Americans, Marshall relied on
English treaties which recognized the sovereign status of Indian nations,
while developing the ‘Doctrine of Discovery’ to make sense of the fact of
American political sovereignty. This doctrine claimed that the European
settlers discovered an otherwise unclaimed territory, whose existing inhabitants could retain ‘diminished’ sovereignty as ‘domestic dependent nations’.
As such they enjoy a ‘guardian–ward’ relationship with the federal government, which places them under its authority and regards them as due its
protection (Berger, 1991: 74–9 and Pommersheim, 1995: 41–3).
Indeed, many Indians saw the IRA as a new form of assimilationism while
others saw it as a step backward. For a discussion of the details and shortcomings of the IRA, see Burnett, 1972: 565–6; Cornell, 1988: 82 and 92–7;
Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 102 and 159; and Pommersheim, 1995: 22.
This is also an issue in Canada, where the Indian Act codifies patrilineal
succession, whereas the (as yet unratified) Constitution entrenches both
gender equality and aboriginal rights to self-determination. This has left
several Canadian tribal governments and women’s groups, including Native
women’s groups, in opposition with each other (McDonald, 1986: 24–5, 33).
Both of these cases involved the Native American Church, a quasi-Christian
religion which uses Peyote to invoke the Holy Spirit. On the basis of People
v Woody, the federal government and 19 states have exempted religious
uses of Peyote from punishment. On both cases, see Burnett, 1972: 572–3;
and Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 232–6. One should note that the US Supreme
Court upheld a drug rehabilitation center’s dismissal of two members of the
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Native American Church for using Peyote (Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 [1990]). In response to this
controversial ruling, the US Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. This Act explicitly prohibited federal or state
agencies from dismissing employees for practicing controversial religious
activities, including the ingestion of Peyote, unless the state could justify its
action as in service of a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and as the ‘least
restrictive means’ for doing so. See O’Brien, 1991: 757.
The charge of interference is made by Kukathas, 1992: 121.
For the purposes of my argument, I will focus only on moral discourses,
since these aim at the type of conflict resolution central to the issues of
cultural pluralism examined here. While ethical-political discourses aimed
at common collective goals may be possible across some cultural boundaries, the type of deep diversity confronted by interaction between Native
and non-Native Americans suggests that common collective goals are
difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve. As often as not, deeply
divided cultural groups seek forms of mutual cohabitation which allow
them, as much as possible, to leave each other alone. For Habermas’ distinction between ethical and moral discourses, see Habermas, 1996: Chapter
4, and Habermas, 1993: Chapter 1.
Although in his more recent work Kymlicka expresses some discomfort
with the term ‘cultural structure’, his conception of a societal culture as a
context of choice still reflects this distinction (Kymlicka, 1995: 83).
Critics who raise this point without adequately distinguishing universality
from uniformity include Iris Marion Young (1990: 157) and Charles Taylor
(1992: 37–43 and 60). For an example of a theorist who does conflate
universality with uniformity, see Russell Hardin (1996: Chapter 5).
For Liberal models of constrained conversation, see Ackerman (1989),
Larmore (1987, 1990), Moon (1993), Rawls (1987, 1988, 1993). For a
succinct contrast between Habermas’ position and that of liberal models,
see Benhabib (1989, 1992: Chapter 3).
For a liberal critique on these lines, see Moon (1993: 93, 98–9). Habermas’
response is given in Habermas, 1996: 313–14.
For an example of this criticism, see Young, 1990: Chapter 4.
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